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RACE FOR THE DECISIVE WEAPON
British, American, and Japanese Carrier Fleets, 1942–1943
James P. Levy

I

t is popularly understood that after the spectacular American victory at the battle of Midway the aircraft carrier reigned supreme; that war at sea was changed
completely; and that the presence of America’s two surviving carriers after the
sinking of Admiral Chuichi Nagumo’s four flattops forced the cancellation of
the Midway invasion and the retreat of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s eleven bat1
tleships, sixteen cruisers, and fifty-three destroyers from the Central Pacific.
The reality was more complex. Midway was, in fact, followed by nearly two years
of war in which carriers notably failed to deliver knockout blows of the kind
most proponents of new technology promise for their innovations. Even at the
battle of the Philippine Sea, despite the lopsided carrier-air duel, more damage
was inflicted on the Imperial Japanese Navy’s ships by U.S. submarines than by
2
carrier aircraft. This is not to say that carriers were unimportant, just that they
spent more of their time in Corbettian activities like providing cover for amphibious landings than in Mahanite fleet-to-fleet combat. Most naval battles in
1942–43 involved cruisers and destroyers rather than carriers. Of the seventeen
engagements fought between the U.S. and Imperial Japanese navies in the
3
Solomons, fifteen were fought by surface ships, two by carriers.
We think of the Pacific war as the “war of the carriers” and the “beginning of the carrier age.” Well, that’s technically true. But keep in mind that only five carrier-to-carrier
battles were fought during the entire war. . . . The “carrier-versus-carrier era” lasted
only twenty-five months . . . [a]nd actually, the last carrier-to-carrier combat that
was anything like an even fight was in October 1942. . . . In effect, the “Golden Age
of Carrier Battles” lasted from May to October 1942.4
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In Europe, the major naval battles in Europe during 1942–43—the Barents
Sea and the North Cape—were gunnery actions. Yet by 1944, everyone agrees,
carriers ruled the waves. Why was it that the primacy of the aircraft carrier heralded at Taranto and Pearl Harbor, and confirmed at Midway, did not immediately come to pass? Why did not carrier forces from that day forward completely
dominate naval combat? This seeming discrepancy between the emergence of
the carrier as the dominant capital ship in 1942 and its full manifestation as the
decisive weapon in naval warfare in 1944 was caused by a chronic shortfall in
carriers and operational aircraft. This was true of all three “carrier powers”: Britain, the United States, and Japan. They all knew what was needed, but previous
losses, ongoing attrition, and regular maintenance made the massing of an overwhelming carrier fleet impossible. Only with the introduction of numerous
Essex-class ships, along with a mass of trained pilots and excellent carrier planes,
was the promise of Midway turned into reality.
This article will compare and contrast the carrier fleets of Great Britain, the
United States, and Japan. In addition, it will examine their activities in the
post-Midway strategic environment and see how each carrier power responded
to the perceived need for additional carrier airpower. We will see how and why
the United States won the race for the decisive weapon of modern naval warfare.
A note on the carriers available to the Americans, Japanese, and British in 1942–
43 is in order. Carriers came in three main types: fleet, light fleet, and escort. We
will limit our discussion here to fleet and light fleet carriers.
As we can see in table 1, the U.S. Navy’s largest operational carrier in 1942 was
its oldest—Saratoga. However, it was torpedoed on two separate occasions early
5
in the war and was out of service for months. Also operational during this period were the Enterprise
TABLE 1
and Hornet, but Hornet
U.S. NAVY CARRIERS 1942–1943
was sunk by the Japanese
Full-Load
Speed
Aircraft
on 24 October 1942. The
Name
Displacement
(knots)
Complement*
Wasp served in the Pacific
Saratoga
43,000
33
63
briefly but was sunk by a
Ranger
17,500
29
72
submarine on 15 SeptemEnterprise, Hornet
25,400
32.5
84
Wasp
18,450
29.5
76
ber 1942. The Ranger was
Essex Class
34,800
32.5
90
classified as a fleet carrier,
Independence Class
14,700
31
30
but because it had trouble
* Theoretical total aircraft complement: 379
re a ch i n g i t s de s i g n e d
speed and was very lightly
protected, it was deemed unsuitable for Pacific Fleet operations. (It did serve in
the Operation TORCH landings in Morocco and again with the Royal Navy’s
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Home Fleet in the summer of 1943.) The U.S. Navy did not operate light fleet
carriers until the summer of 1943, when the first of nine Independence-class
ships, built from converted light cruiser hulls, made their appearance. All nine
were completed in 1943, but only the first four were in action by the end of that
year. More critical for U.S. Navy operations were the big Essex carriers on the way
in 1942; four joined the Pacific Fleet by November 1943, with ten more building.
It was these carriers that would sweep the Pacific.
The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) operated a substantial carrier fleet in
1942–43, as we can see in table 2. Despite the losses at Midway, Japanese carriers
proved themselves a match for American ones in the battles around the
Solomons. The centerTABLE 2
pieces of their carrier
IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY CARRIERS 1942–1943
force were the sisters
Name
Full-Load
Speed
Aircraft
Shokaku and Zuikaku—
Displacement
(knots)
Complement*
well armored and fast,
32,105
34
72
Shokaku, Zuikaku
and with large air groups.
28,300
25
53
Junyo, Hiyo
They were probably the
14,200
28
30
Zuiho
8,000
29
37
Ryuho1
best carriers afloat until
13,366
26
31
Ryuho2
the Essex class commis37,000
33
72
Taiho
sioned. The converted lin15,300
29
30
Chitose, Chiyoda
ers Junyo and Hiyo were
*Theoretical total aircraft complement: 317
much less impressive,
with little armor, inadequate speed, and suspect engines. The light carrier Zuiho was a fine ship and
served its country well. Confusingly, Japan successively commissioned two light
carriers named Ryuho. U.S. carrier planes sank the first on 24 August 1942; it was
replaced by a converted submarine depot ship that proved a disappointment in
service. No new fleet carriers joined the IJN in 1943, but the armored fleet carrier Taiho and the light fleet carriers Chitose and Chiyoda were due to enter service in early 1944.
Table 3 gives us the details of Royal Navy carriers. The hard-to-categorize car6
rier Eagle served with the fleet briefly during the period under discussion. It was
a converted First World War–era battleship, and this author tends to categorize
it as a light fleet carrier. Eagle spent its distinguished wartime career in the Mediterranean, where it was sunk by U-boat torpedoes during Operation PEDESTAL
in August 1942. The British had five fleet carriers in commission during 1942–
43: Furious, Illustrious, Formidable, Victorious, and Indomitable. Furious was a
converted light battle cruiser, and despite age and dodgy engines that often
sent it back to port for repairs, it performed yeoman service. Illustrious, Formidable, and Victorious were sturdy, well-armored carriers that sacrificed air
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complement (normally
thirty-three to thirty-six
aircraft) for deck and side
Name
Full-Load
Speed
Aircraft
7
Displacement
(knots)
Complement*
protection. They could
Eagle
22,600
24
21
carry additional aircraft
Furious
22,450
30
36
by parking planes on the
Illustrious, Formida28,620
30.5
33
ble, Victorious
flight deck (which was
Indomitable
29,730
30.5
45
standard American pracUnicorn
20,300
24
35
tice but contrary to Royal
Implacable Class
32,110
32
60
Navy policy). Their half*Theoretical total aircraft complement: 236
sister Indomitable had
been redesigned during
construction with somewhat less armor but additional hangar space. Two fleet
carriers (Implacable, Indefatigable) that would join the fleet in 1944 struck a
good balance of armament, speed, and air complement. The unique Unicorn
had been designed before the war as a maintenance carrier to support overseas
deployments. It was pressed into service as a light fleet carrier in 1943.
As can be seen from table 4, carrier strength fluctuated widely throughout the
period in question. The table clearly reveals how well major naval operations
dovetail with carrier availability. One sees this with Operation WATCHTOWER
(the Tulagi/Guadalcanal landings) in August 1942, Operation PEDESTAL the
same month, TORCH in November 1942, and Operation HUSKY (the Sicily invasion) in July 1943. Operation GALVANIC, the Tarawa/Makin amphibious assaults, took place as soon as enough Essex and Independence-class carriers were
ready for action, in November 1943. The exception to this pattern is the Japanese
carrier force’s inaction during 1943, for reasons discussed below. The IJN’s carriers withdrew from combat after their costly victory at the battle of Santa Cruz
in October 1942 and did not sortie again until June 1944. However, Japanese carrier planes, sans carriers, operated repeatedly from land bases throughout 1943.
Carriers are useless as combatants without proper aircraft. After the availability of hulls, the factors that determine the power and effectiveness of carrier
forces are the number and quality of planes embarked and the training of their
aircrews. In this respect the United States held a distinct edge over Britain and
Japan. (The characteristics of the various aircraft types in use during the period
under discussion are summarized in table 5.) The British were dependent on
short-range fighters converted from land use and a slow biplane torpedo
bomber for most of 1942–43. This is not to say that the Sea Hurricane, Seafire,
and Albacore were objectively bad aircraft. What hurt them was how they fit into
midwar carrier operations. The Seafire was basically an interceptor, with a weak
undercarriage prone to damage and landing accidents. The British had a true
TABLE 3
ROYAL NAVY CARRIERS 1942–1943
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TABLE 4
OPERATIONAL CARRIER STRENGTH JULY 1942–NOVEMBER 1943
Imperial Japanese Navy
Fleet

Lt. Fleet

Royal Navy

U.S. Navy

Fleet

Lt. Fleet

Fleet

VIFIL

E

ESWR

R

VIFILFu

E

ESWR

Zu

ILFu

ESRH

Zu

ILFu

ERH

ZJ

VFILFu

ER

ZJ

VFILFu

ES

FILFu

ES

Zu

VFILFu

ESR

ZuR2

VFFu

ESR

ZJH

ZuR2

VIFFu

ESR

May

SZJH

ZuR2

VIF

June

SJ

R2

VIF

July ’42

S

August

SZ

September

SZ

October

SZJH

November
December
January ’43

ZJ

Zu

February

ZJ

March

ZJH

April

Lt. Fleet

SR
U

SR

July

SZ

ZuR2

VIFILFu

August

SZJ

Zu

VFIL

U

SR
EsYSR

In

September

SZJ

Zu

VFIL

U

LSR

InPBw

October

SZJH

ZuR2

VFILFu

EsYSRL

InPBwC

November*

SZH

ZuR2

VFu

EsYRLBhE

InPBwC

KEY
Japan: S = Shokaku, Z = Zuikaku, J = Junyo, H = Hiyo, R = Ryuho, Zu = Zuiho, R2 = 2nd Ryuho
Royal Navy: V = Victorious, I = Indomitable, IL = Illustrious, F = Formidable, Fu = Furious, E = Eagle, U = Unicorn
U.S. Navy: E = Enterprise, S = Saratoga, W = Wasp, R = Ranger, H = Hornet, Es = Essex, Y = Yorktown, L = Lexington, Bh = Bunker Hill, In = Independence,
P = Princeton, Bw = Belleau Wood, C = Cowpens
Sources: A. J. Watts and B. G. Gordon, The Imperial Japanese Navy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971); E. Bergerud, Fire in the Sky (Boulder, Colo.: Westview,
2000); N. Friedman, British Carrier Aviation (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1988); H. A. Gailey, The War in the Pacific (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1995); H.
Jentschura, Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1977); Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, ed. J. L. Mooney
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959–67); grateful acknowledgment is extended to D. Ashby of the Naval Historical Branch London and C.
Rounsfell of the Fleet Air Arm Museum Yeovil for help in compiling this table.
*Saratoga left service for major refit after the first week of November 1943.

carrier fighter that could escort strike formations, the Fulmar, but it was too
slow to deal with modern opposition. The Albacore was optimized as a torpedo
bomber, and most Albacore crews were trained for night antishipping strikes
with torpedoes. Many Albacores had surface search radar attached to their
underbellies.
Unfortunately, the Royal Navy in 1942–43 needed an aircraft for bombing
and close air support much more than an obsolescent torpedo plane best suited
to antishipping strikes. The Barracuda, though not the failure it is sometimes
portrayed as having been, was not the major improvement the Fleet Air Arm
(FAA) needed. Its deficiencies forced the British to procure U.S. planes under
Lend-Lease. British pilots were good, but relatively small carrier air groups and
less than stellar aircraft limited FAA effectiveness. A comparison of air groups in
the summer of 1943 is illuminating. When the name-ship of the Essex class became operational, it carried an air group of thirty-six Hellcats, thirty-six
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TABLE 5
CARRIER AIRCRAFT
User

Max. Speed
(knots)

Combat Radius
(nm)

Armament

FIGHTERS
Zero

IJN

267

335

2 x 20 mm, 2 x 7.7 mm

Fulmar

RN

211

275

8 x .303-in.

Sea Hurricane

RN

252

200

4 x 20 mm

Seafire

RN

289

237

2 x 20 mm, 4 x .303-in.

Wildcat

USN/RN

274

265

4 x .50-in.

Hellcat

USN/RN

280

324

6 x .50-in.

Kate

IJN

178

209

1 x 21-in. torpedo

Jill

IJN

225

355

1 x 21-in. torpedo

Albacore

RN

122

348

1 x 18-in. torpedo

Barracuda

RN

198

196

1 x 21-in. torpedo or 1 x 1,600-lb. bomb

Avenger

USN/RN

209

348

1 x 24-in. torpedo or bombs (2,000 lbs.)

TORPEDO BOMBERS

DIVE-BOMBERS
Val

IJN

201

332

816 lbs.

Judy

IJN

272

450

1,300 lbs.

Dauntless

USN

192

382

1,000 lbs.

Helldiver

USN

222

652

1,000 lbs.

Sources: Owen Thetford, British Naval Aircraft since 1912, 6th rev. ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991); and James F. Dunnigan and Albert A. Nofi,
Victory at Sea (New York: William Morrow, 1995).
8

Dauntlesses, and eighteen Avengers—a staggering ninety aircraft. That July Indomitable embarked thirty Seafires and twenty-one Albacores, while Formidable
had six Seafires, twenty Martlets (the British name for Wildcats), and eighteen
Albacores aboard—in all, ninety-five planes. Thus these two British carriers together only roughly equaled the combat power of Essex alone. Their only advantage over a single Essex-class ship would have been that two hulls are harder to
disable than one, and RN carriers had a slight edge in armor and survivability.
By way of comparison, in October 1942 Zuikaku operated its designed maximum of seventy-two aircraft: twenty-seven Zeroes, twenty-seven Vals, and eigh9
teen Kates. In terms of planes, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps during 1942
averaged 3,191 combat aircraft in their collective inventory; the Fleet Air Arm
fielded 461 combat aircraft in frontline service (carrier and land-based) in Sep10
tember of that year.
Also problematic for the British was carrier doctrine. Rear Admiral Reginald
Henderson had experimented with multicarrier operations in the early 1930s.
The 1939 Fighting Instruction specified that the role of the carriers was to “deny
11
the use of aircraft to the enemy” by finding and sinking his carriers. When war
came, the Home Fleet had a flag officer, “Vice Admiral Aircraft Carriers,” tasked
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with overall control of carrier operations. He had up to three carriers under his
direct command (Ark Royal, Furious, and Glorious) during the Norwegian campaign in May and June 1940—although they tended to work in pairs, two on op12
erations and one back at Scapa Flow (in the Orkneys) refueling. Even the strike
on Taranto, Italy, in November 1940 was to have been a multicarrier operation,
13
but damage to Eagle precluded its participation. However, in 1943 opinion was
still divided within the RN on how many carriers could work together effectively, whether each carrier should have its own screen or all should share a collective one, and whether one carrier should maintain the defensive combat air
patrol overhead or each should contribute a small number of fighters to a com14
bined CAP. Although the RN was prepared to use up to three carriers together
defensively (as in Operation PEDESTAL, the crucial relief convoy for Malta in August 1942), it lacked experience and training in multicarrier offensive operations. Because carriers were so widely needed, and because of losses, battle
damage, overhauls, and transit times to the many theaters of operation, the British rarely got the chance to mass their carriers. So even if the Royal Navy had had
a coherent carrier doctrine based on massive strikes delivered by massed carriers, as the United States and Japan did, real-world demands would have militated (as in fact they did) against its implementation.
British operational procedure was also different, partly for philosophical reasons,
partly for practical ones. To avoid corrosion from constant exposure to sea spray
and reduce the risk of multiple losses in landing accidents, British practice was to
strike aircraft immediately below into the hangar upon landing, not park them on
the flight deck forward. This made sense, given the paucity of British planes and
typical Atlantic sea conditions. However, combined with the slow speed of British
aircraft, it meant that RN air groups took more time launching, forming up, and
landing than did their U.S. and Japanese counterparts. This consumed fuel, reduced
15
combat radius significantly, and slowed the tempo of operations.
By contrast, Japanese carrier planes were very good. Two outstanding aircraft,
the Judy dive-bomber and the Jill torpedo plane, entered service in large numbers by the end of 1943. However, the Zero remained in the order of battle long
after the American Hellcat made it obsolete. Losses were hard to make up, and
replacement-pilot quality was low. The IJN devoted great effort after Midway to
revamping its naval air force, but the process took two years. By then, the United
States, with twice Japan’s population and ten times its gross national product,
had far outstripped anything Japan could hope to match in terms of ships,
planes, or trained personnel.
The U.S. Navy, after the replacement of the Devastator with the Avenger, had
no real weakness in its air arsenal, and its training program and rotation policy
could produce high-quality pilots with ease. Crucial in the period under
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discussion was the replacement of the very good Wildcat with the excellent Hellcat; the capture of a crashed, yet largely intact, Zero fighter in the Aleutians in
June 1942 helped American designers produce in the Hellcat a superb
Zero-killer. Late in 1943 the Dauntless dive-bomber was replaced by the marginally better Helldiver. Overall, by November 1943 the U.S. Navy enjoyed a spectacular advantage over the RN and the IJN in the sheer bulk of high-quality
ships, planes, and aircrews it could throw into action. Even in the interwar years
planes and pilots had not been in as short supply in the U.S. Navy as they had
been in the Royal Air Force–dominated Fleet Air Arm or the quality-obsessed
16
IJN, wedded to the “invincibility of refined technique.”
American carrier doctrine flowed out of the big air wings of Lexington and
Saratoga. It has been argued that tests using these large air groups prior to World
War II made the U.S. Navy uniquely conscious of the emerging primacy of the
aircraft carrier. This assertion has been partially undermined by two pieces of
evidence: first, the U.S. Navy’s building program up through the Vinson Act in
1940 devoted more money to battleship procurement than to building aircraft
carriers; second, American fleet tactics as developed in the 1930s were battleship17
centric. Yet it is true that the atmosphere of relative scarcity in which the British and Japanese carrier air forces developed were in marked contrast with the
situation in the United States. British and Japanese admirals were obliged to
ponder anxiously the likelihood of having to fight a “come as you are” war, without the massive infusion of new ships, planes, and pilots that American admirals
could largely take for granted. What one historian of D-Day has written in response to critics of the U.S. Army is just as true for the Navy: “To accuse Americans of mass-production thinking is only to accuse them of having a
mass-production economy and of recognizing the military advantages of such
18
an economy. The Americans were power-minded.” This cornucopia of power
would underwrite the swift disintegration of Japan’s military position after November 1943.
For the U.S. Navy, the period from Midway to the carrier raids on Rabaul
(June 1942–November 1943) embodied two themes: wearing down the Japanese
and building up overwhelming strength for the decisive drive across the Central
Pacific. This is why operations during that period were largely confined to the
Solomons and the southwest Pacific. Before the war, the “Rainbow Five” plan envisioned a drive across the Central Pacific at the earliest possible opportunity.
But the need to protect Australia and keep the restless and influential General
Douglas MacArthur occupied intervened; Pearl Harbor and carrier losses in
1942 delayed the effort also. But in the southwest Pacific land-based airpower
could augment carrier forces until the Essex and Independence–class ships became fully operational. Between December 1942 and June 1943 Essex, Lexington,
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Yorktown, Bunker Hill, Independence, Princeton, Belleau Wood, Cowpens, and
19
Monterey all commissioned. The Americans, however, refused to rush them
into service, preferring to work them and their air groups up to great efficiency
before committing them to battle. This decision left a serious gap in available
carrier strength throughout the winter and spring of 1943. Enterprise being not
at 100 percent efficiency due to damage inflicted in autumn 1942, the Pacific
Fleet was down to Saratoga in May, June, and July 1943. (It was backstopped by
the Royal Navy’s Victorious, which was deployed to the Pacific Fleet from March
20
through July.) Whenever a large carrier force was available (August 1942, November 1943) the U.S. Navy could independently take the offensive, otherwise
not. Despite this, MacArthur and Admiral William F. Halsey (then commanding
the South Pacific Force) could keep up the pressure on the Japanese, because
they had substantial U.S. Army Air Forces and Marine Corps air assets in New
Guinea and the Solomons. But by November 1943, when five fleet and four light
fleet carriers were ready for action in the Pacific, Admiral Chester Nimitz (commanding the Pacific Ocean Area) could begin his island-hopping campaign at
Tarawa with little fear of successful Japanese intervention. In December 1943
Nimitz’s Task Force 50, comprising four fleet and two light fleet carriers, could
operate independently against Japanese air bases at Kwajelein Atoll with 386
combat aircraft embarked.21 Carrier aircraft could now cover any attack the
Americans chose to make.
The Japanese, by contrast, faced in the period from Midway to the battle of the
Philippine Sea a bewildering series of strategic dilemmas that proved well nigh
insurmountable. The physical and psychological damage inflicted at Midway
haunted the Imperial Japanese Navy and sapped its will; the battles of attrition
in the Solomons and New Guinea sapped its strength. No fleet carriers joined the
Combined Fleet in 1943, and the two converted liners that were pressed into service in 1942 (Junyo, Hiyo) were both inferior to any of the four ships lost at Midway. Although the number of Japanese carriers available often exceeded those of
the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Japanese admirals were unwilling to risk them, as more
would not be immediately forthcoming; American land-based airpower acted as
a further deterrent to offensive action. In addition, the quality of Japanese pilots
was in near free fall during 1943, and things would get worse, not better. Lack of
fuel curtailed training, a desperate need for new pilots led to a shortened curriculum, and the Combined Fleet refused to release combat-experienced men to
22
become instructors; all three factors took their toll. By the winter of 1943–44
Japanese pilots were lucky to get 275 hours of flight training, while American pi23
lots were not released to squadrons until they had 525 hours in the air. Added
to this, the effective assassination of Admiral Yamamoto in April 1943 further
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increased the gloom within the IJN. Wherever his successor, Admiral Mineichi
Koga, turned, he could perceive only Allied strength and Japanese weakness. The
fact that Koga’s intelligence picture was at best rudimentary while American in24
telligence efforts were huge and largely successful did not help matters. Should
Koga defend Truk? Bougainville? Rabaul? New Guinea? Should he husband his
25
resources or make a stand somewhere in 1943? The grimness of the situation
seems to have paralyzed the upper echelons of the Japanese navy until early in
1944, when the threat of a landing in the Marianas galvanized its planners.
Japanese carrier planes after the Pyrrhic victory at Santa Cruz in October
1942 fought exclusively from land bases until the Combined Fleet’s last realistic
throw of the dice at the Philippine Sea in June 1944. Zuikaku, Junyo, and Zuiho
had been poised to cover the evacuation of Guadalcanal in January 1943, but the
26
Americans failed to intervene. In April, after a general lull as both sides licked
their wounds from Guadalcanal, Yamamoto ordered ninety-six Zeros and
sixty-five Vals from his carrier air groups to Rabaul in support of Operation
I-GO. The plan was to launch four big air raids on bases in the Solomons and
western New Guinea to disrupt Allied operations in the area. Because the defenders were alerted by decrypts of Japanese signals, the raids netted a disappointing twenty-five enemy planes knocked out and a U.S. destroyer, a New
Zealand corvette, a tanker, and two transports sunk, at the cost of forty Japanese
27
carrier aircraft. The planes were ordered back to Truk on 17 April. In July
ninety-two planes were dispatched from Junyo, Hiyo, and Ryuho to Rabaul,
where all were lost. In November, 150 more aircraft from Shokaku, Zuikaku, and
Zuiho were thrown into the maelstrom after Allied air raids by as many as 213
heavy and medium bombers and 138 P-38 Lightning fighters threatened to neutralize Rabaul, thus uncovering both Bougainville and the northern coast of
New Guinea. Half the planes were lost, and the rest were withdrawn after two
28
weeks. The resulting absence of fighters away at Rabaul rendered infeasible any
attempt by the Combined Fleet to intervene when the U.S. struck at Makin and
Tarawa later in November.
The strategy of diverting carrier planes to Rabaul has often been criticized,
but one is left with the impression that Admirals Yamamoto and Koga had little
choice. If planes were hard to replace, ships were irreplaceable entirely, and
land-based operations did not risk them. If we can see now that pilots were the
true key asset and that Japanese pilots by the time of the “Marianas Turkey
Shoot” were hopelessly outclassed by more experienced and better trained
American ones, all that was probably not so clear in April 1943. Given the power
of American land-based air forces in the southwest Pacific, it is difficult to imagine that planes would have fared better operating from carriers than they did deployed to land bases. Furthermore, the Judys and the Jills reaching squadron
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service in 1943 were excellent attack planes, and Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa went
into battle in June 1944 with more carriers and operational planes—approxi29
mately 460 to 420—than Nagumo had at Pearl Harbor. Using carrier planes to
protect Rabaul, the key to Japan’s entire position in the South Pacific, and to buy
time for new ships and planes to come on line must have seemed a good bet. In
any case, given the immense American strength then on the way, two hundred
pilots saved in 1943 could in no way have turned the tide for Japan in 1944.
Therefore, although in theory and hindsight we may find fault with the Japanese
decision to use carrier planes to prop up Rabaul, it was probably no worse than
doing nothing—an inevitable consequence of Japanese material inferiority
vis-à-vis the United States.
For its part, the Royal Navy’s Fleet Air Arm was obliged throughout 1942 and
1943 to tailor its force to the defense of convoys and amphibious operations. The
FAA’s major combat area from Operation PEDESTAL in August 1942 to the
Salerno landing in September 1943 was the Mediterranean. With no enemy carrier fleet to contend with, the British needed fighters, fighters, and more fighters
to deal with German and Italian aircraft. This led to a skewing of carrier air
groups. Whereas Victorious was operating a standard mix of twenty-one Albacore torpedo bombers and twelve Fulmar fighters in July 1941, in August 1942 it
carried only six Albacores but eighteen Fulmars and six Sea Hurricane fighters.
By the summer of 1943 it had embarked thirty-six Martlets (Wildcats) but only
twelve Avengers. In May 1942 Formidable operated twenty-one Albacores and
twelve Martlets; in November 1942 it carried six Albacores, six Seafires, and
30
twenty-four Martlets for Operation TORCH. Thus the 1941 ratio of attack
planes to fighters had been reversed. With few if any targets for its Albacores’ torpedoes, the FAA failed to garner the wider experience the U.S. Navy and IJN
found in the Pacific. When the FAA went back onto the offensive in 1944 it had
to readapt to strike missions that were very different than Taranto, Matapan, or
the Bismarck chase. Although the Royal Navy on average operated as many fleet
carriers in the period under discussion as the U.S. Navy or the IJN, smaller air
groups and less combat experience left the British carrier fleet behind those of
the other two carrier powers in flexibility and striking power. Also, whereas the
U.S. Navy could field over nine hundred carrier planes in June 1944 and the Japanese about half that number, in the summer of 1944 squadrons on the Royal
31
Navy’s six operational fleet carriers totaled about 288 planes. Thus it was that
by the summer of 1944 American carriers were first to reach the critical mass
necessary to smash any surface fleet within reach. Ozawa’s ships survived the
battle of the Philippine Sea because they fled and Admiral Raymond Spruance
did not pursue. Potential had been transformed into reality.
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All three carrier powers understood the value of carriers, but due to losses, damage, and the relentless need for maintenance there were never enough of them
operational to suit any navy in 1942–43. Without carriers, it proved impossible
to sustain continuous operations. The timing and pace of campaigns, especially
for the Americans and British, were largely determined by the availability of carriers. Although land-based airpower substantially substituted for carrier forces
in the southwest Pacific and in Italy (after the Anglo-Americans were firmly ensconced in Sicily and southern Italy), operations like HUSKY, GALVANIC, and later
FLINTLOCK (Guam) and ICEBERG (Okinawa) were unthinkable without carriers.
Only they could neutralize enemy airfields and counterattacks. Further, the carriers of the United States and Britain became indispensable for the defense of
amphibious operations and convoys. Only carriers—fleet, light, and escort—
could respond in a quick and timely manner to events in and around distant
beachheads. Carrier airpower had become the decisive weapon in naval warfare.
The U.S. Navy, the Royal Navy, and the Imperial Japanese Navy all raced to
achieve a critical mass of carriers, pilots, and planes in 1942–43. Ironically, the
Japanese and the British, often portrayed as too wedded to the battleship, had
become at least as “carrier conscious” in their construction priorities as the
Americans. Although the idea that the U.S. Navy had a unique interest in carrier
airpower going back to the early 1930s is widespread, it is illuminating to consider that whereas the Royal Navy’s 1937 “wish list” of capital-ship strength as of
late 1942 was twenty battleships and fifteen carriers, in July 1940 the U.S. Navy’s
General Board envisioned a future fleet of thirty-two battleships and fifteen car32
riers. Obviously, the U.S. Navy was as enamored of the big gun as anyone. More
concretely, after the British completed the battleships Anson and Howe in June
and August 1942, respectively, and the Japanese commissioned the Musashi in
August, that was it. Dock space, steel, and labor were shunted thereafter by both
Britain and Japan into carrier and antisubmarine escort construction. The British battleship Vanguard, under construction in 1942, was given such low priority
that it did not commission until 1946, and the Japanese completed Musashi’s sis33
ter ship Shinano as a carrier. The British completed two fleet and five light fleet
carriers between Midway and the end of the war, with two more fleet and eleven
light fleet carriers still building at the termination of hostilities. Japan com34
pleted six fleet and three light fleet carriers between Midway and final defeat.
Yet the United States won the race hands down. Once the primacy of the carrier was established, the Americans applied their vast economic strength and engineering know-how to the problem and so decided the issue.35 It took time, but
economic strength was converted into military power quickly and effectively.
Archetypal carrier-versus-carrier battles ceased because in the two years 1942–
44 the Americans completely outstripped the competition. They commissioned
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sixteen fleet and nine light fleet carriers prior to VJ Day. They also managed to
finish five battleships and two battle cruisers of the Alaska class between the time
of Midway and Nagasaki (although the four Iowas and the Alaskas were rather
36
gilded lilies). The Americans also built their ships faster than the other carrier
powers. The British fleet carriers Implacable and Indefatigable took over four
years from keel-laying to commissioning. The Japanese fleet carrier Taiho took
thirty-two months to complete. By comparison, the USS Intrepid took twenty
37
months from laying down to completion, Franklin twenty-five months. It was
thanks to the prodigious output of U.S. shipyards, aircraft factories, and flight
training schools that the promise of Midway was fulfilled in the great Central
Pacific offensive of late 1943 through 1945.
All weapons systems require time to develop both the numbers and the doctrine necessary for optimal effect in combat conditions. Like the tank before it,
carrier airpower needed time to reach a critical mass of units and experienced
operators before its full potential could be realized. In the race for the decisive
weapon of naval warfare, the navies of Britain, Japan, and the United States all
quickly identified the primacy of the aircraft carrier once they were seriously engaged in the war at sea. The United States alone was able to mobilize the financial, technological, and industrial resources needed to procure a force of ships
and planes that could humble enemy battle fleets and seize local command of
the sea. In this unique ability to manifest huge material and intellectual assets in
the form of carrier airpower lie the roots and reality of American naval supremacy from June 1944 until today.
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